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Introduction 
The imperfections of capital market caused by the uncertainty of investment returns, the 
asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and potential investors, and the lack of 
collateral available to entrepreneurs create financial constraints and funding gaps for new 
ventures (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Hellmann, 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Kirsch et al., 2009). 
Such imperfections have a negative impact upon the provision of early-stage finance and limit 
the ability of new ventures to develop their inventions and knowledge into practical 
commercial applications (Lindstrom & Olofsson, 2001; Widding et al., 2009). It is, therefore, 
difficult for new ventures to gain access to external finance in the early stages of development 
because traditional investors (e.g. banks, business angels and venture capitalists) are attracted 
to the more cost effective and less risky investments available in established firms. Thus, 
entrepreneurs usually utilise their own capital or that from family and friends to finance proof-
of-concept and other early star-up costs (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010). 
Within the context of start-up finance, Shane and Cable (2002) and Zhang and Wong (2008) 
have suggested that social networks may provide a solution to early-stage finance gaps leading 
to an assumption that online social networks could provide access to a new funding stream 
referred to as crowdsourcing. Latterly, Shiller (2013) indicated that resources dispersed over 
millions of people must be activated to successfully grow an economy and crowdsourcing is 
one means by which this can be achieved. 
A great deal of interest has recently been paid to crowdsourcing among scholars in 
management and entrepreneurship studies. While most early contributions focused on crowd 
resources (Hempel, 2006; Howe, 2006), more recent works have focused upon the 
contribution a crowd can make to “open innovation”, a combination of open resources and 
innovation concepts (Gruber & Henkel, 2006), and the ability of the crowd to collate financial 
resources (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2011). Moreover, the rising interest in 
crowdfunding is evidenced by the increasing number of refereed journal articles being 
published that cover a diverse range of themes, including process, platforms, the dynamics of 
operation (Ordanini et al., 2011; Wieck et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014), and regulations that 
manipulate the relations between financial receivers and crowd funders (Bradford, 2012; 
Lehner, 2013; Stemler, 2013).  
Crowdfunding, therefore, seeks to overcome the problems faced by new ventures by 
utilizing a large dispersed audience, ‘the crowd’, to contribute relatively small sums of money 
by using an open call, commonly through the internet (Sigar, 2012; Lehner, 2013; P. 
Belleflamme et al., 2014). Crowdfunding has been used for various purposes, for example to 
fund research projects (Cameron et al., 2013; Loucks, 2013), film, music and game projects 
(Sorensen, 2012; Weigmann, 2013), and new firm start-ups (Ibrahim & Verliyantina, 2012; 
Lehner, 2013). 
Shiller (2013) has suggested that the funding issues faced by start-ups can, potentially, be 
resolved by an innovative method of securitization namely equity crowdfunding. This is 
because the process has the opportunity to increase the number of investors and the amount 
invested, and also change the investor/investees relationship due to changes in investor 
objectives and investor interference. This is emphasised by a comment made by President 
Obama, “for start-ups and small businesses, this bill is a potential game changer”, upon signing 
the JOBS (Jumpstart our business start-up) act (Mollick, 2014). However, being new 
phenomena, our understanding about the nature of equity crowdfunding and its contributions 
to entrepreneurial activities are explorative. Thus, this study attempts to survey and draw 
together the equity crowdfunding element of entrepreneurship studies, to review the past 
research in this field, and to outline opportunities for potential further research in equity 
crowdfunding within the entrepreneurship context.  
In doing so, a systematic review (Tranfield et al., 2003) and a ‘fit for purpose’ methodology 
(Macpherson & Jones, 2010) are adopted to categorize and classify the existing literature in 
order to collate a knowledge base that summarises our current understanding of the 
crowdfunding phenomena. This paper then reviews the diffusion of equity crowdfunding in 
entrepreneurship studies which have been published in Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) 
and elsewhere up to December 2014. To undertake the research, ‘protocol driven’ and 
‘snowballing’ methods (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005) have been employed. Because 
crowdfunding is a new research domain and only a minority of academic articles specifies 
equity crowdfunding, this paper will collect all papers with titles, abstracts or keywords 
containing the expression ‘crowdfunding’ published in the SSCI and Business Source Complete 
databases. These papers have been systematically reviewed to construct a knowledge base of 
equity crowdfunding. An initial set of 77 papers were obtained; however, 38 papers were 
excluded from the study as they were either short essays or represented personal reflections. 
Thus, in total, this study reviews 39 papers published by the end of 2014.  
All collected literature was read to identify the core themes of research in relation to equity 
crowdfunding; these were identified as equity crowdfunding within an entrepreneurial 
context, fund receivers (entrepreneurs), crowdfunders, and regulatory environment (the 
government). To present the findings of this study, the paper firstly describes how 
crowdfunding was conceptualised in management studies before exploring the notion of 
equity crowdfunding as an alternative source of funding for early stage firms. This will be 
undertaken through an analytical comparison between equity crowdfunding and other, more 
established sources of funds. The paper will scrutinize equity crowdfunding within the context 
of early stage firms from the perspective of the investor, entrepreneur and government to 
highlight the contribution made by equity crowdfunding and possible gaps in the literature. 
Finally, the paper suggests a research agenda that is based upon the adoption of agency theory 
(Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003), signalling theory (B. L. Connelly et al., 2011), and behaviour theory 
(Brian L. Connelly et al., 2010) to explore, investigate, and further develop our understanding 
about equity crowdfunding and how it contributes to enterprises. 
Crowdfunding Conceptualization 
The concept of crowdfunding originates from the disciplines of micro-finance and 
crowdsourcing, but contains unique features facilitated by the rapid growth of the Internet 
(Poetz & Schreier, 2012; Sorensen, 2012; Mollick, 2014). Crowdsourcing relates to activities in 
which a large group of participants (i.e., individuals, institutions, non-profit organization, or 
companies) respond to a flexible open call by undertaking voluntary tasks (Howe, 2006; 
Brabham, 2009; Bayus, 2013; 2013; Schwartz, 2013; P. Belleflamme et al., 2014). 
Crowdsourcing can benefit participants by creating a context in which ideas can be generated 
and, through the creation of networks, provide feedback on those ideas, facilitate product 
development via the testing of early prototypes through to the funding of the process 
(Brabham, 2009). It also triggers a new model of business development in which the crowd is 
mobilised to support a new venture as active customers, investors or both (P. Belleflamme et 
al., 2014). 
External investment is often the catalyst that transforms an idea into a commercial offering, 
however entrepreneurs often find that investors, either through equity or debt, are very 
circumspect about understanding the risks associated with new ventures (Riedl, 2013). As a 
consequence, informal external investment associated with the friends and family of the 
founder, or other high net worth individuals (business angles) is already far more important 
than other forms of funding, and crowdfunding has the potential to enhance this form of 
investments (Lehner, 2013). Crowdfunding, as a part of crowdsourcing, is to raise capital 
directly through investments from large groups of interested people either as a donation or in 
consideration of some reward (Ordanini et al., 2011; Schwartz, 2013).  
In fact, crowdfunding model has been historically utilised to collect small amounts of 
money from many people for the charitable purposes and social cooperation (Ordanini et al., 
2011). The successful services of intermediaries (e.g. Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Crowdcube) in 
organizing crowdfunding activities attest the viability of this vehicle of attracting investment 
(Ordanini et al., 2011); in addition, the levels of investment from crowdfunding platforms have 
significantly increased suggesting that the new method of mobilising informal investment has 
considerable scope in the future (Paul Belleflamme et al., 2013).  
From crowdfunding to equity crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding has been classified into various models. For example, Larralde and 
Schewienbacher (2012) identify three crowdfunding models: donation, passive and active 
investments. Donation crowdfunding model in which the crowd does not receive any kind of 
return has been used for long time for the charitable purposes or non-profit institutions 
(Lehner, 2013). The passive crowdfunding model involves some rewards for investors, such as 
products, honorary recognition or other forms of revenue shares, while the investors in the 
active crowdfunding models not only provide money but also bring the best manner of open 
sources. Other authors (2013; Wieck et al., 2013; P. Belleflamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014) 
have categorised crowdfunding into four types: donation (patronage), reward, lending, and 
equity models and this approach seem to be most popular with scholars, governments and 
practitioners. Reward model in which entrepreneurs offer different nonfinancial rewards, for 
example acknowledgements, products, services, or creative rewards in return for investments 
is the most prevalent. In this model, crowdfunders are often treated as early customers, able 
to access product at an earlier date and offered better prices and/or other special benefits. 
This kind of pre-selling product model is a common choice of entrepreneurs who are producing 
novel software, hardware, or consumer products. Lending (debt) model allows crowdfunders 
to lend money to and receive interest and the return of the principle loaned after some fixed 
term. Finally, start-ups or SMEs utilise equity to offer part ownerships and shares of any future 
profits made by new venture to third parties in exchange for a cash injection (Schwartz, 2013; 
Mollick, 2014). 
However, Lehner (2013) believes that donation is saturated because the number of 
crowdfunding initiatives and platforms for this funding market increase rapidly; and when the 
crowd can actually become shareholders of new ventures donation becomes less important 
alternative market. Additionally, studying individual crowdfunding practices, Paul Belleflamme 
et al. (2013) found that donation-based crowdfunding model has become less common in 
practices, and most of crowdfunding projects offer either non-financial rewards (final products 
or tokens of appreciation) or financial compensations (equity or profit-share arrangement). In 
pre-order model, when the amount of capital required is significant, the entrepreneur will 
reduce the offering prices to attract more participants. However, when the distortion is too 
large, the pre-order model is unlikely to be the best choice (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014).  
According to P. Belleflamme et al. (2014), for larger capital needs, entrepreneurs prefer 
investments from investors rather than through pre-sales or reward in returns. It is because 
the rewarding function in the reward (pre-order) model limits the interaction between a new 
venture and its investors (Lehner, 2013). In such cases, profit-shared model, thus, seems to 
generate more benefits to crowdfunders. The choice between debt and equity finance of 
investors and entrepreneurs is influenced by the stage and phase of ventures, aspects of risk 
dispersion, legal regulations, cooperate governance and reputation (Kreiser et al., 2010). 
However, the equity model essentially democratises the financing activities by allowing all 
kinds of investors with various characteristics and deferent levels of wealth become venture 
capitalists (Shiller, 2013). Thus, it becomes more unavoidable (Larralde & Schewienbacher, 
2012) and is one of current financial innovation to allow simple projects to raise needed capital 
(Shiller, 2013). However, because the equity model requires a control of high-level regulation 
(Mollick, 2014) but current regulations in many countries are incomplete, it is less preferred 
than other models in such countries (Lehner, 2013). 
Equity crowdfunding vs. Traditional financing methods 
Traditional finance (provided by banks, business angels, venture capitalists) typically involves 
only a few experienced people or institutions rather than a large group of individuals. In 
contrast, because basing upon the internet, an equity crowdfunding campaign can easily and 
quickly reach potential investors than a traditional method does (Schwartz, 2013). Thus, the 
costs and risks per investor in equity crowdfunding projects are significantly lower than in 
public offering, business angel and venture capital models (Ordanini et al., 2011).  
It is free for registration and lower cost to promote an equity crowdfunding project via the 
internet. The registration requirements and regulatory accompanying a public securities 
offering are too onerous; registration costs for public offering generated by the compliance 
with the extensive securities laws and regulation are too expensive and disproportionately 
burdensome on small offerings of entrepreneurs (Lehner, 2013). Using a public offering of 
equity also incurs significant costs for entrepreneurs as a consequence of the necessary due 
diligence (Lehner, 2013). Additionally, the promotion costs that call for public relations, 
catering, travel, printing, and many other types of specialists are expensive endeavours. 
Furthermore, equity crowdfunding issuers can avoid the costs for quarterly or annually 
obligational audited reports (Schwartz, 2013). Instead of using the author’s to-be-written 
book, equity crowdfunding takes the concept of one step further which allows entrepreneurs 
and investors to find one another on the internet (Schwartz, 2013). In general, the outweigh-
benefit costs may discourage and prevent entrepreneurs from raising capital from public 
offering (Cumming & Johan, 2013). 
Furthermore, the high investment thresholds, inability to diversify portfolio investments, 
investment costs (Loucks, 2013), the limited number of solicited investors and actual investors, 
and the minimum wealth requirements of investors preclude many venture capitalists and 
business angels from investing to emerging growth companies (Cumming & Johan, 2013). 
Thus, Loucks (2013) suggested a critical need for the bridge of financial market through the 
equity crowdfunding model. It is because equity crowdfunding allows the small and high-risk 
projects to be funded by both small and big investors (Riedl, 2013), and helps entrepreneurs to 
collaborate with investors to undertake their entrepreneurial projects and manage new 
ventures (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014). The benefits of an equity crowdfunding model are not 
only the financial aspect but also additional contributions into production, promotion and 
distribution made by the crowd (Sorensen, 2012). However, Sigar (2012) indicated that equity 
crowdfunding projects per se contain high risks with the uncertainties of crowdfunders about 
the project’s legitimacy and development of products or services. They also have a high rate of 
failure and may face administrative and accounting challenges that require meticulous and 
laborious bookkeeping of a large number of shareholders. 
Equity crowfunding: Crowdfunder, founder, and government perspectives 
Crowdfunders 
The investment process in an equity crowdfunding model may go through three distinct 
phases (Ordanini et al., 2011). First, approximate half of the target capital will be obtained 
quickly by the rapid and significant investments from those have direct links with the projects 
or their creators, such as friends or family. The second phase is normally a more gradual 
growth of investment created by the desirability of the pitch and through word-of-mouth. 
Many projects fail at this phase primarily because of the inability to trigger the interest of the 
crowd. Finally, the investments will come from others who can access to the called project 
through the internet. 
Through the conduit of the internet, equity crowdfunding is able to mobilise social 
networks in which online participants can share information, knowledge and suggestions, or 
select initiatives to support and provide financial capital (Ordanini et al., 2011). It is the 
participation by the  crowd that creates the interest in social media that will attract more 
potential funders to the crowdfunding platform (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014). It is through 
these processes that entrepreneurs can have a global reach and access crowdfunders (S. A. 
Zahra et al., 2008; Shaker A. Zahra et al., 2009; Lehner, 2013). 
In equity crowdfunding, the opportunity of an initiative has to be not only identified by 
entrepreneurs but also recognised and evaluated by the crowd (Lehner, 2013). Unlike other 
traditional investors, crowdfunders are unlikely to use any analytic software tool to evaluate 
the feasibility and commercial potential of projects (Riedl, 2013). Thus, entrepreneurs are 
suggested to use various instruments and strategies to communicate with a mass of 
heterogeneous people who can passively listen to available information or actively look for 
opportunities to make their commitment decisions (Lehner, 2013). 
The involvement of a crowdfunder is based upon his/her own personal motivations  
(Lehner, 2013) will shift between passive and active depending upon the individual’s 
motivation since, besides providing financial resources, they can contribute ideas, information 
and solutions, and support the start-up process (Larralde & Schewienbacher, 2012). In an 
equity crowdfunding project, even contributing non-trivial amounts of money to early-stage 
ventures, crowdfunders also expect monetary returns from their investments (Ordanini et al., 
2011). However, the majority of crowdfunders enjoy the investment experience which is linked 
to community benefits generated by the crowdfunding activity (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014). 
They enjoy the feeling of belonging to a group of special people, making an involved record in 
a special occasion, engaging in an innovative behaviour, being the first used highly interactive 
tools, and helping a friend or someone else to overcome a social or personal cause (Ordanini et 
al., 2011). In general, the participants are more likely to be motivated by the enthusiasm of the 
group of crowdfunders for the desired outcome of the new venture than ensuring monetary or 
other tangible incentives (Lehner, 2013). 
Ordanini et al. (2011) found that crowdfunders are from groups of people with unforeseen, 
chaotic and complex behaviours. Thus, a small omission of firm’s action can lead to a 
hyperbolic response (Lehner, 2013) and negatively influences the belief of potential investors 
(Ordanini et al., 2011). It leads to the fact that local investors are likely to invest earlier with 
more responsive decisions to projects created by trusted people even though equity 
crowdfunding is a global approach (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014).  
Founders 
Similar to other traditional funding methods, information asymmetry between entrepreneurs 
and crowdfunders is a challenge in any equity crowdfunding model  (P. Belleflamme et al., 
2014). To mitigate these difficulties, entrepreneurs rely upon the capabilities of the internet 
(Lehner, 2013) to establish their connections with the crowd during the funding process (P. 
Belleflamme et al., 2014). This process enables the entrepreneur to communicate to a global 
audience the potential of the idea and the qualities of the founding teams (Lehner, 2013). 
Riedl (2013) found that entrepreneurs who already have large social networks are likely to 
be more successful in equity crowdfunding than those whose existing social networks are 
narrow. It is because social networks can help potential investors to access information related 
to the characteristics and reputation of entrepreneurs, and social information about other 
crowdfunder’s decisions. However, according to P. Belleflamme et al. (2014), a successful 
equity crowdfunding is likely to rely on the quality of start-up toward possibility of delivering 
promised products or services rather than the quality of products or services. 
To accurately provide credible signals and disclosure information about the quality of start-
ups (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014), and to ensure that the process of an equity crowdfunding 
project was appropriately managed, Ley and Weaven (2011) suggest entrepreneurs need to 
have an initial screening criterion, and Weigmann (2013) advises creating a good website with 
a convincing video. All provided information should show that the project is technically savvy 
that consumers can appreciate and value (Riedl, 2013), and must contain the start-up’s 
financial roadmap, board structure, and risk factors (Cumming & Johan, 2013). Ordanini et al. 
(2011) also found that a project without a minimum individual investment target is likely to 
attract more participants with small amounts of contributions. In contrast, an equity 
crowdfunding project is likely to fail if it requires too much funds, or already received external 
certifications such as awards and government grants because the crowd assume that the 
project were valuable then they do not need to raise any external equity (Cumming & Johan, 
2013). 
Governments 
Mollick (2014) found that there has been a new trend in studying and exploring the potential 
and risks associated with equity crowdfunding to identify adequate policy action. Both 
intermediaries and policy makers are suggested to help entrepreneurs to create realistic plans 
and goals to ensure that their crowdfunding projects are low rate of fraud and high rate of 
growth. Thus, many countries including the United State, European state members, and 
Australia have introduced equity crowdfunding Acts to encourage and stimulate the 
innovation and entrepreneurship. These Acts have been established as exemptions to the 
Securities Act creating a big change in securities regulation in many ways (Schwartz, 2013). 
First, the crowdfunding Act allows SMEs and start-ups to sell securities to not only business 
angels and venture capitalists, but also friends, relations and other investors through the 
internet. Second, the Act does not require a minimum investment per individual, and there is 
no limit on the number of investors leading to a possibility of huge number of investors 
involved in a project. However, the regulation limits the maximum amount money that each 
individual can invest each year to protect crowdfunders from potential loss, and a start-up can 
raise as a registration constraint applied to equity crowdfunding (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014). 
Finally, crowdfunding intermediaries are required to ensure that each investor understands 
the risk generally applicable to investments start-ups, the risk of illiquidity, and other 
appropriate matters. Such intermediaries have to check the background of the issuer’s 
directors, officers, and substantial investors, provide such disclosures to reduce the risk of 
fraud, and authorize actions against those “make untrue” or omit statements to mislead the 
investors (Schwartz, 2013).  
To leverage the equity crowdfunding activity of new start-ups, the regulation only requires 
a basic disclosure such as the name, legal status, address, website, the names of directors and 
officers, business plans, and financial conditions. Moreover, successful crowdfunded issuers 
have to provide annual reports of its financial statements and operational results. Issuers must 
offer their shares through the registered crowdfunding portal, and self-offerings are prohibited 
(Schwartz, 2013). These crowdfunded securities can be transferred between investors after 
one year or between family members. Thus, the secondary market of crowdfunded securities 
will be very small due to the number of share’s orders from an equity crowdfunding issuer is 
smaller than in a registered one (Schwartz, 2013). 
Cumming and Johan (2013) found that, in general, crowdfunders require more disclosure 
information from start-ups, a limitation on the number of entrepreneurs can raise crowdfunds, 
and a lower threshold of audited financial statements. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs prefer fewer 
disclosure requirements and restrictions on the ability to crowdfund, and a free trading of 
crowdfunded shares as well. Investors and portals are indifferent to crowdfunding laws, but 
both prefer non-strict regulations in order to maximise the crowdfunded capital and want 
strict regulations and mechanisms related to risk mitigation. 
Proposed research agenda 
The results from literature review have revealed the limits of our understanding about the 
nature of equity crowdfunding and its contributions to entrepreneurial activities. Thus, this 
paper proposes a research agenda for future equity crowdfunding studies in the 
entrepreneurial context towards three perspectives: Crowdfunders, entrepreneurs, and 
government.  
Crowdfunders 
Equity crowdfunding activities are facilitated by the internet, and involved funders who will be 
from a group of heterogeneous people. Because each individual has different values, self-
pictures, needs and wants, it is difficult to predict the decision of a large heterogeneous crowd 
that behaves in unforeseen, chaotic and complex manners (Lehner, 2013). Thus, further 
research on the individual explanations of funders in the equity crowdfunding needs to be 
undertaken. Being a new topic, our understanding about the decisions of crowdfunders to 
commit financially to start-ups is still limit. Thus, this paper would suggest future researchers 
to employ behaviour theory (Brian L. Connelly et al., 2010) and grounded theory method to 
study the decisions and incentives of investors in equity crowdfunding. 
Schwartz (2013) indicated that a limited disclosure of an equity crowdfunding project is 
likely to increase fraud and inaccurate information. Unlike other registered security method, 
equity crowdfunders have to make their decisions based upon such limited information 
provided by entrepreneurs through online platforms. It means either small or high net worth 
investors (business angels and venture capitalists) can not apply the normal due diligence 
process. Thus, a different study on special due diligence process for equity crowdfunders 
needs to be undertaken to help investors to acknowledge how to evaluate the provided data, 
market risk, people risk, technology risk, and monetary risk, and to make the investment 
decision. 
Entrepreneurs 
In equity crowdfunding, how to attract crowdfunders is the key element of a project. This 
depends on the business plan and communication strategy of the entrepreneurs. A business 
plan can be consist of market opportunity, product or service explanations, business model, 
people involved, financial, strategy, and dilution schedule. Although, P. Belleflamme et al. 
(2014) believe that an equity crowdfunding project per se serve as a signal of high-quality, this 
study proposes a future research on how to write a business plan and chose communication 
strategy to attract more investors in the condition that the internet platforms normally allow 
entrepreneurs to provide limited information.  
In entrepreneurship research, the potential investors assess the readiness of new ventures 
to move to the next level when making an investing decision (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Each 
investor has different scales and ratings of the new venture’s readiness basing upon 
technology, market, and management stage (Douglas & Shepherd, 2002), or the business, 
risk/returns ratio, and time to exit (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Additionally, studying the early stage 
financing of new ventures, other scholars have found that the funding decisions depend on the 
investor’s perception of management skills, business model, potential market, growth 
perspective (Mason & Harrison, 2004), shortcut heuristic (Maxwell et al., 2011), and the 
presentation of entrepreneurs (Clark, 2008). In general, potential investors trend to look for 
the signal of future success from the new ventures when making funding decisions (Meseri & 
Maital, 2001). Thus, this study suggests future researchers to employ investment readiness to 
study how a good equity crowdfunding proposal must be.  
Furthermore, how large are the number of crowdfunders and the amount of capital needed 
for an equity crowdfunding project is a challenged question. So far, the current literature has 
not addressed this challenge and the entrepreneurs have to make their own decisions based 
on their experience or personal advisors. A studying about the methods of financial forecasting 
and assessing financial needs is required to help entrepreneurs to identify a reasonable 
amount of crowd equity. Moreover, because the shares of firms can be hold by strangers, risks 
and concerns will be raised for entrepreneurs even it is a single non-voting share (Schwartz, 
2013). Thus, risk management for start-ups used equity crowdfunding method needs to be 
studied. 
Asymmetric information, investment readiness and networks 
Beside the uncertainty of the investment returns, information asymmetry plays an important 
role in the financial markets  (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Entrepreneurs and investors unequally 
access to the information about the new ventures leading to the absence of perfect 
information (Certo, 2003). In fact, entrepreneurs possess more inside information about the 
true intentions, planned activities, and value of the firms than outside investors (Amit et al., 
1990; Prasad et al., 2000); this asymmetric information can lead to the rejection of good 
investment opportunities or underinvestment (Myers & Majluf, 1984). An investment is likely 
to be undertaken when the financial providers are able to mitigate the risks derived from the 
information asymmetry problems (Cumming & Johan, 2008). However, in equity 
crowdfunding, the limited disclosure information seems to aggravate the asymmetric 
information problem between investors and investees (P. Belleflamme et al., 2014).  
Investors can reduce the information asymmetry regarding to the intentions and planned 
activities of entrepreneurial teams, and  the value of new ventures through contingency 
(incentive) contracts and monitors (Kreps, 1997). The asymmetric information can be 
alleviated via signals (Certo, 2003) conveyed by the knowledgeable parties or/and through 
screening activity which seeks for additional information from uninformed parties (Lee & 
Venkataraman, 2006; Carpentier et al., 2010). These parties can have direct or indirect 
relationships with entrepreneurs, and they thus can receive relevant information about the 
entrepreneurial teams. 
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) argued that entrepreneurs at early stages may rely on their 
social networks. Many scholars have proved that social ties provide a potential mechanism to 
reduce the information asymmetry between potential investors and entrepreneurs (Uzzi, 
1996; Freiburg & Grichnik, 2012). Social networks also provide additional information about 
the values of new ventures (Granovetter, 2005), and leverage the trust between entrepreneurs 
and financial providers (Kautonen et al., 2010) eventually positively influence the investment 
decision. Even Mollick (2014) found that “threshold funding, active participation by large 
communities, frequent interaction between founders and potential funders, and the ability of 
founders to broadcast signals of quality” are likely to help the crowd to identify quality 
projects and reduce the change of fraud, our understanding about the roles of social networks 
in equity crowdfunding is still limited.  
Ownership and control 
Equity crowdfunding not only is the mean for entrepreneurs to share risks to other investors 
but also disperses their control and governance on start-ups.  Shareholders can gain their 
control of the firms by purchase shares from other holders (Schwartz, 2013). The increasing 
dispersion of control may impede the entrepreneurial activities of entrepreneurs in performing 
their experimentations, adjusting the business strategy, and entrepreneurial innovation. How 
to balance the benefit of equity crowdfunding with the disadvantages generated by the 
dispersion of control is a challenged question. 
Moreover, in equity crowdfunding, shareholders of start-ups generally have the right to 
vote and coordinate, and all activities are facilitated through the internet (Schwartz, 2013). 
Agency theory could be adopted to investigate the cost-control mechanisms of equity 
crowdfunding model which reflect the likely acceptance of the investor-investee relationships 
in start-up finance. Future research on how the ownership and control rights of crowdfunders 
can be managed through internet must also be undertaken. 
Mollick (2014) found that large numbers of successful crowdfunding projects delated to 
deliver their promised products because of the increase of crowdfunder’s expectations in the 
complexity and scope of the project. Thus, several relevant questions on how to ensure that 
initial resource endowments prove adequately to mitigate the risk of delay or failure, how a 
successful equity crowdfunding project develops and delivers promised products or services, 
and how entrepreneurs can develop an altering plan if necessitated need to be answered. 
Regulatory environment 
The regulation landscape for equity crowdfunding around the world provides a fascinating new 
financial market (Cumming & Johan, 2013). Although over billion dollars invested by millions of 
crowdfunding backers, complete regulations to encourage the equity crowdfunding activity of 
entrepreneurs and academic knowledge on this domain are still limited (Mollick, 2014). Shiller 
(2013) believes that equity crowdfunding is not only an exciting concept but also a dangerous 
innovation because it can be used to abuse people, so it needs to be constantly updated and 
improved. Similar to public offering of a company’s securities, equity crowdfunding faces 
multi-faceted challenges including regulatory hurdles, governance and control (Lehner, 2013), 
and requires a high regulation to prevent fraud and ameliorate crowdfunding market. 
Moreover, Cumming and Johan (2013) proposed that there are potential risks associated with 
equity crowfunding, such as entrepreneurs dilute the equity stake held by crowdfunders by 
issuing more shares to themselves, pay themselves more, and not invest in the project after 
successfully finishing the crowdfunding campaign. Thus, studying the advantages and 
disadvantages of the current regulations will help policy makers to improve relevant acts to 
encourage practical equity crowdfunding activities. Future researchers need to find out how to 
perfect relevant regulations in the national context, as well as in the international environment 
because equity crowdfunding is a global financing method. 
Conclusion 
This paper provides a theoretical review of the extant literature and develops from that review 
an agenda for future research. The study identifies the core themes of research in relation to 
equity crowdfunding; these were identified as equity crowdfunding in entrepreneurship 
context, fund receivers (entrepreneurs), crowdfunders, and regulatory environment (the 
government). The paper describes how crowdfunding was conceptualised in management 
studies and how the notion of equity crowdfunding as an alternative source of funding for 
early stage firms was emerged. The paper also scrutinize the equity crowdfunding within the 
context of early stage firms from the perspectives of the investor, entrepreneur and 
government to highlight the contributions made by equity crowdfunding and possible gaps in 
the literature that could help inform the future research. Based upon the findings of the 
theoretical review, the paper suggests research directions in which future researchers can 
employ behaviour theory (Brian L. Connelly et al., 2010), agency theory (Arthurs & Busenitz, 
2003), and signalling theory (B. L. Connelly et al., 2011) to explore, investigate, and accomplish 
our understanding about equity crowdfunding in the entrepreneurial context. 
While the findings from the review are robust, it is acknowledged that there are areas 
within the research process that could impinge upon strength of the work. In comparing the 
requirements of a systematic review, the number of collected articles was restricted because 
of the limitation on the number of published papers in equity crowdfunding. Moreover, those 
recently published articles have been written a few years ago before publishing on top 
journals. Thus, it suggests reviewing more working papers on SSRN or anywhere else to 
capture more up-to-date discussions in relation to research topics in equity crowdfunding. 
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